|Laman Webantu KM2A1: 4030 File Size: 6.7 Kb *|
AWise: Airport Co. Bad Day at the Races
By Andrew Ho
21/3/2001 8:51 pm Wed
[Penswastaan dan perlumbaan adalah dua wawasan Mahathir yang asyik
kedengaran terkandas sejak akhir-akhir ini. Berbelanja mega bukan
penentu kejayaan, sebaliknya ia hanya akan mempercepatkan kita tumbang
kerana berbunganya hutang dan pelanggan yang semakin tidak sudi untuk
datang. Banyak negara boleh maju dan laku walaupun tidak membina sesuatu
yang mencekik wang saku.
KLIA kini cuma beroperasi dengan kapasiti 2/3 sahaja. Sudah empat
syarikat besar kapalterbang menjauhinya. Tiket lumba Sepang pula
tidak laku dan cuma 40% terjual. MAB masih kerugian sehingga pelabur
sudah naik jeran. Itupun MAB berhasrat untuk berbelanja RM 1 bilion
lagi untuk mengubah suai LTAB Subang menjadi pusat lelongan.
MAB kini amat bergantung kepada 3 pelanggan utamanya - Malaysia Airlines
(MAS), Singapore Airlines dan Cathay Pacific Airways - mereka menyumbang
lebih 67% pendapatan. Tetapi MAS kini sedang tenat
berhutang dan rugi RM459 juta pada suku 3Q, dan sedang terbang menjunam untuk
mencecah kerugian terBESAR sebanyak RM1 billion pada 2001.
Pendeknya semakin besar semakin ketinggalan..... ini bukannya satu wawasan
tetapi satu kesewelan pemikiran. Layakkah ini menjadi satu sukatan pelajaran
untuk universiti tempatan?
By Andrew Ho, AsiaWise
7 Mar 2001 18:00 (GMT +08:00)
When Kuala Lumpur's spanking new international airport was privatized at a cost of 1.3
billion Malaysian ringgit, it was to be the cornerstone of growth for Malaysia Airports
Malaysia's largest privatization gave MAB a superb facility for a fraction of the RM10.7
billion construction bill - and it was payable over five years. On top of that, the country's
other airports - four international, 14 domestic and 19 short take-off and landing facilities
- were added into MAB's pot at nominal cost. In return, MAB undertook future
development of KL International and agreed to upgrade the other airports.
KL International can handle 25 million passengers a year and there's room to grow.
Utilization is still less than two thirds what it could be, despite promotions pushing KL as
Southeast Asia's gateway and big ticket events, including the Formula One, aimed at
improving traffic and economies of scale.
Apart from traditional airport operations, MAB's earnings come from Formula One venue
Sepang International Circuit, duty free shops located at its international airports, legacy
income from oil palm plantations and hotel revenue.
When MAB debuted on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange in December 1999, the
counter was a hit, closing at a 24% premium to its RM2.50 start-up price its first day of
trading. With the sweet privatization deal and promising fundamentals, the market
consensus put MAB's fair value somewhere between RM3.50 and RM4.00 on a discounted
cash flow basis.
Not everyone was convinced. The bears cited gateway competition from Changi in
Singapore, Dong Muang in Bangkok and Chek Lap Kok in Hong Kong. Management's lack
of focus was also a concern - hosting Formula One could end up being not a prize, analysts
worried, but a major distraction. And cash flows were also a concern, given capex needs
for upgrading KL International and other airports.
MAB's allure essentially ended with its IPO. Results for 2000 shocked - net profit slumped
54% year-on-year. More disturbing still, MAB missed its net profit forecast of RM210
million by a whopping 40% - this despite 11% and 22% increases in passenger and cargo
traffic respectively, at KL.
What happened? The Formula One happened and promptly rang up a RM23 million loss.
Then the hotels lost money and on top of everything else, the airports ran up unanticipated
operating costs. MAB's loss at the races prompted it to ask the government to effectively
subsidize the event by pegging all USD expenses at RM2.50 - when it takes RM3.80 to
buy a buck. To top off MAB's sad story, 60% of Formula One tickets are still unsold with
the start of this season's second leg less than two weeks away.
Stripping out other income, airport operations recorded a dismal pretax profit of between
RM5 million and RM7 million for 4Q2000. The total net loss for the fourth quarter of 2000
was RM17.9 million.
Cracks started appearing on KL's runway even before the IPO. Lufthansa stopped all
passenger flights in September 1999 and Qantas followed last April, suspending flights
after consolidating services with shareholder British Airways. Then BA announced it
would suspend flights beginning this April. All Nippon Airways is getting out completely
later this month after cutting back to five runs a week last March.
MAB and the Minister of Transport contend the cuts are insignificant. Walter Culas,
chairman of the Airfreight Forwarders Association of Malaysia, disagrees: "The matter
is of great concern as it could have an adverse effect on the industry as well as the country
in the long run if airlines are pulling out.''
Currently Malaysia Airlines (MAS), Singapore Airlines and Cathay Pacific Airways,
MAB's three top customers, contribute over 67% of airport revenue. MAS is struggling as
it is. It reported a net loss of RM459 million for 3Q, and is on the way to an anticipated net
loss of RM1 billion in 2001.
To add to investor's concerns, MAB recently announced a RM1 billion plan for the old
terminal at Subang. It will be redeveloped into an Asia Pacific Auction Center (APAC),
which won't be ready for three or four years.
With dismal results and deteriorating financials, only eight securities houses bother to provide earnings forecasts for MAB these days. To compound matters, the company has been looking to place shares with foreign investors. Some 200 million have been earmarked for foreign institutions but there are few takers. At RM1.66, MAB is trading at a 34% discount from its IPO price and it will be a while before the tower clears this lumbering bird for takeoff - it's still trying to find the taxiway