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AWSJ: Johor State Loan Problems Woes By Leslie Lopez 14/6/2001 2:10 am Thu |
The Asian Wall Street Journal Debt-Workout Agency Is Ordered To Restructure Johor State's Loans
Move Raises Doubts About Government-Backed Loans
By LESLIE LOPEZ Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
KUALA LUMPUR, Malaysia -- Malaysia's bad-debt woes are spreading to
the public sector, raising questions about Kuala Lumpur's backing for
government-affiliated borrowers and the level of nonperforming loans
in the country's banking system. In an unpublicized move, the Malaysian government this month directed
the state-run Corporate Debt Restructuring Committee, or CDRC, to help
restructure 5.5 billion ringgit ($1.45 billion) in debt owed to local
and foreign creditors by Perbadanan Johor, or Johor Corp., the main
investment arm of the Johor state government.
The directive is unprecedented. The CDRC was formed to help arrange
corporate-debt restructurings after Asia's 1997 financial crisis left
many Malaysian companies unable to repay their creditors. But the
Johor Corp. assignment marks the first time the CDRC has been asked to
help resolve debt problems at an agency owned by a state government.
CDRC officials confirmed that they have begun working on Johor Corp.'s
bad loans, but declined to comment further. Johor Corp. executives
said they weren't immediately prepared to discuss the matter.
The government's decision to order the CDRC to help Johor Corp. --
instead of stepping up to guarantee or otherwise back the company's
borrowings -- is worrying Malaysian bankers familiar with the
development. Some say the move makes it unclear to what extent the
federal government ultimately stands behind Malaysia's officially
acknowledged public-sector debt -- which was estimated to total 77.23
billion ringgit at the end of last year -- and an unknown amount of
borrowing by entities such as Johor Corp.
The Johor Corp. affair also puts a spotlight on the way Malaysia
accounts for nonperforming loans, bankers say. They suggest that the
amount of Malaysia's nonperforming loans -- which officially stood at
26.3 billion ringgit, or 6.7% of total loans in the banking system, at
the end of February -- may be understated. That's because Malaysian
banks have generally continued to carry troubled loans to state-linked
entities, such as Johor Corp., on their books as income-producing
assets. In the past, Malaysian banks haven't worried too much about possible
defaults by such companies because their loans were usually backed by
so-called comfort letters from state governments. "It's not a full
guarantee, but provides enough comfort that the state government will
back these groups in the event of a default," says a chief executive
of a Malaysian bank that does extensive business with state agencies.
Now, Johor Corp.'s problems are testing the commitment of state governments to stand behind debts run up by the enterprises they own, as well as the federal government's commitment to back up the state governments. A senior federal government official familiar with Johor Corp.'s
finances says that by transferring responsibility for a debt
restructuring to the CDRC, Kuala Lumpur is signaling that it won't
intervene to rescue such companies. "The government's resources are
limited. State agencies will have to sell assets and restructure"
their loans, says the official. He adds that banks that lent to such
concerns will have to "take haircuts," or losses, on loans that aren't
guaranteed by the federal government.
Kuala Lumpur's financial position is already stretched. According to
the latest Finance Ministry report, issued in October, about 19.4
billion ringgit of the acknowledged 77.23 billion ringgit in
public-sector debt is owed by the federal government. A total of 57.8
billion ringgit is owed by so-called nonfinancial public enterprises,
including two of Malaysia's biggest publicly listed companies, Tenaga
Nasional Bhd., the state-controlled power company, and national
telecommunications company Telekom Malaysia Bhd.
The federal government's other financial obligations include
guarantees it has extended on various loans to state-backed projects
and businesses. The last published report by Malaysia's auditor
general, released last year, said that such federally guaranteed loans
totaled 48 billion ringgit at the end of 1999, up from 32.3 billion
ringgit a year earlier. The size of Johor Corp.'s debt problem caught many Malaysian bankers
by surprise. "There was a time I would readily lend to Johor Corp.
because they were among the most professional of all state agencies,"
says the chief executive of a bank with a small exposure to Johor
Corp. "It makes you wonder about the position of other agencies."
Johor Corp. was formed in 1968 to act as the main investment arm of
the Johor state government. By the mid-1990s the agency controlled
more than 200 companies, employed more than 21,000 people locally and
abroad, and had interests in palm-oil plantations, property
development, health care, timber, hotels, finance and steel
manufacturing. But this aggressive expansion was funded largely by bank borrowings.
When Asia's financial crisis hit in mid-1997, Johor Corp. was unable
to service its debt. The company owes about 4.5 billion ringgit to
local banks and one billion ringgit to foreign financial institutions.
Despite its diverse business undertakings, only Johor Corp.'s
health-care, palm-oil and property divisions are profitable. A recent
report by the Rating Agency of Malaysia on Johor Corp. estimated that
the company accrued interest obligations of about 116.3 million
ringgit last year, when the company faced repayment of principal on
its loans totaling an additional 100 million ringgit. "Given the
group's earnings profile, the 5.5 billion ringgit of debt is
untenable," said the rating agency's report.
Bankers and government officials say it is difficult to estimate the
quantity of bad loans that other state government-owned concerns like
Johor Corp. could be harboring. But they believe that Malaysia's
banking system can absorb the impact should more such bad loans
surface. "The only problem is that these unexpected loan problems will
delay the full recovery of the balance sheets [of banks] from the
crisis," says one bank executive. |